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Abstract. In recent time the critique of the whole brain death as the criterion of hu-
man death, that was introduced in 1968, has been growing. The paper aims to show in 
systematically that there are good reasons based on empirical findings combined with 
Thomistic Christian anthropology to accept the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion 
as the criterion of human death. This will be shown through a systematic critique of 
other criteria of death: whole brain death, higher brain death, brain stem death, and 
controlled cardiac/circulatory death. The traditional cardiopulmonary criterion of death 
provides the opportunity to maintain the dead donor rule for organ transplantation. This 
also affirms the respect for human life required by the ethics of the sanctity of human 
life. The paper further provides a justification of dead donor rule. The paper proposes 
35 minutes period after cardiac arrest to declare the patient dead, since at that time 
there is no possibility to autoresuscitate the heart. 
Keywords: human death; criterion od death; cardiopulmonary criterion of death; whole 
brain death; higher brain death; dead donor rule.
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Introduction
Humans have always been intrigued by the question of when a man is still 
alive and when (s)he can be considered dead. With the development of 
science, technology, and medicine, this question has become even more 
pressing. “At the end of the last century, a new definition of death was 
introduced. In the past, the irreversible loss of heart and lung functions 
had signaled death. The new definition was based on the irreversible loss of 
brain functions. The transition from the heart to brain grew out of several 
parallel developments that converged in 1968… It began in 1947 when 
Claude Beck performed the first successful defibrillation of a human heart. 
Suddenly, death was ‘reversible.’ In 1950, Bower and Bennett developed 
positive pressure ventilation.” (De Georgia 2014, 673). It was not clear when 
a patient is dead. A patient with a respirator could breathe without any 
brain activity. Was (s)he alive or not? A new definition of death, which is 
also called neurological, was not accepted by all physicians or philosophers. 
The controversy remains until the present. In this paper, I try to defend the 
thesis that the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion of death is the only 
valid criterion of human death. To support this thesis, I will use the argu-
ment confirmed by several empirical cases. The paper will also provide the 
justification of the dead donor rule and propose a minimum of 35 minutes 
after asystole required to declare a patient dead.
1. The history of the concept of brain death
When considering the history of the concept of brain death, it is often argued 
that its contemporary meaning was first described in the definition of the ir-
reversible coma introduced by Harvard Medical School in 1968 to gain organs 
for transplantation (Jonas, 1974).1 Let us briefly have a look at the history of 
1 Robert Truog speaks of the procurement of organs for transplantation as an important 
factor in the introduction of the brain death criterion (Truog, 2007, 280). Schiff a Fins 
speak of the first mention of brain death in Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School 
1968 (Schiff and Fins, 2016, R572).
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this concept to see how much can be accepted by this meaning. The concept 
was first used in 1800 by Xavier Bichat in his work Recherches physiologiques 
sur la vie et la mort. He understood brain death as a local cessation of the 
neural area of life while other local areas of life are still preserved for a longer 
or shorter period of time (Métraux, 2001, Volek, 2009, 23). The concept of 
brain death in its current meaning started to evolve independently of the 
issue of the procurement of organs for transplantation. Organ transplanta-
tion has been made possible by technological advances and the invention 
of immunosuppressives. The concept of brain death in its current meaning 
was made possible by the developments in intensive care (Machado, 2007, 
ch. 1).2 The concept of brain death in its current meaning as the criterion 
of death started to evolve in 1952 in Ibsen’s publications, who had started 
to use mechanical ventilation for breathing and ended in the formulation 
of brain death in the current meaning by Wertheimer in 1960. The concept 
was then connected with the issues pertaining to mechanical ventilation 
and the continuation of intensive care without yet any connection with the 
issues pertaining to transplantations (Machado et al., 2007; De Georgia, 
2014; Moskopp, 2017). In 1963 in Louvaine, Belgian surgeon Guy Alexander 
performed the first transplantation based on the criterion of brain death then 
referred to as deep coma. Alexander talked about this procedure at a CIBA 
Symposium on Transplantation in London in March 1966 (Machado, 2005). 
Brain death as a criterion of death during reanimation and employment of 
technical means when one cannot use the criterion of cessation of breathing 
and blood circulation was suggested by the Committee for reanimation and 
transplantations of the German Surgeon Society in 1968. They also proposed 
signs characterizing brain death (Kommission, 1968). 
On August 5, 1968, in its report entitled The definition of irreversible 
coma the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School determined 
irreversible coma as a new criterion of death and also specified the condi-
tions for determining brain death (Ad Hoc Committee, 1968). That same 
2 Calixto Machado is a proponent of the definition of death as the irreversible loss of con-
sciousness (Machado, 2007, 200-201), which puts him among the proponents of the high-
er brain death criterion. 
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day, whole brain death (WBD) was accepted as a criterion of death at the 
22nd Congress of the World Medical Association (Gilder, 1968; De Georgia, 
2014, 675). The main interest of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee 
was to redefine the criterion of death to obtain organs for transplantation 
(Giacomini, 1997). The Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee’s report 
was still criticized for an unprecise terminological definition of brain death 
(Jonas, 1974). Further publications tried to address these shortcomings. 
Leon R. Kass defined death as the disintegration of an integrated whole 
and an event (Kass, 1971). In 1972 Capron and Kass suggested there are 
four levels of argumentation concerning the death of a human being and 
proposed a definition of human death (Capron and Kass, 1972, 102–103). 
The first level is the level of basic concept. It is the definition of death. One 
type of definition they suggest is the “permanent cessation of the integrated 
functioning of an organism as a whole” (Capron and Kass, 1972, 102).3 The 
second level is the level of general physiological standards that include 
the criteria of human death. The third is the level of operational criteria 
that further define what is meant by the operational standards. The fourth 
level is the level of specific tests or procedures for determining whether the 
criteria have been met. The second level is to be used for the purposes of 
legislation. The first is too general and it would be too complicated to solve 
the conflict between the various views. The third and fourth levels are too 
specific and connected with the results of empirical sciences that undergo 
constant development (Capron and Kass, 1972, 103). 
Bernat, Culver and Gert suggested three levels of argumentation per-
taining to the determination of human death, viz. definition, criteria, and 
testing (Bernat, Culver and Gert, 1981) that are also accepted by Shewmon 
(2010, 278–281). They thus connect Capron and Kass’ third and fourth 
3 This definition is accepted by many influential authors and gremia: Bernat, Culvert and 
Gert, 1981, 390; President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedicine and Behavioral Research, 1981, 58; National Conference of Commission-
ers of Uniform State Laws, 1980; Bernat, 1998, 17; Bernat, 2006, 38; President’s Council on 
Bioethics, 2008, 59-64. Shewmon (2001, 458) equates the understanding of the cessation 
of integrated functioning as a whole with somatic integration; this position is criticized 
by the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008, 59–65).
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level into one level and moved the cardio-pulmonary criterion to the level 
of testing as a way of determining when the whole brain function ceased 
(Khushf, 2010, 336). It is more appropriate to distinguish the four levels 
since it is more precise. Capron and Kass also suggested a detailed defini-
tion of the criterion of death, which they located to the second level of the 
general physiological standards. Death is determined by a physician upon 
the irreversible cessation of the spontaneous respiratory and circulatory 
functions. If these functions are preserved by artificial means, the physician 
determines death based on the irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain 
functions (Capron and Kass, 1972, 111). 
These suggestions also influenced the definitions of the President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedicine 
and Behavioral Research (1981) that already defined them as two equal 
criteria without the specification of circumstances when they are to be 
used. This commission also formulated two possible interpretations of 
these criteria.4 One of these interpretations gives priority to WBD and the 
cardio-pulmonary criterion becomes a test when the function of the whole 
brain is irreversibly lost since the brain tissue is bound to die if not supplied 
with blood. The second interpretation commences with the cardio-pul-
monary criterion. New technologies mask the effects of death through the 
support of breathing. Both these criteria are the criteria of one phenomenon 
of death (President’s Commission, 1981, 6, 32–38, ch. 3, 5). Bernat (1998) 
prefers the first interpretation. Kass (Kass, 1971) and Capron (Capron and 
Kass, 1972, 111), and the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008) prefer the 
second. President’s Commission (1981) and the President’s Council (2008) 
define the integrating function of an organism as a whole via the integrating 
effect of the brain, heart, and lungs. Other authors specify just the brain as 
the integrating organ (Bernat, Culver and Gert, 1981, 391). The President’s 
Commission (1981) agrees with the suggestion of Capron and Kass to define 
death at the second level of argumentation (56). 
After approval of the Universal Determination of Death Act (UDDA) drafted 
by the National Conference on Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and 
4 For more on these interpretations see Khushf, 2010.
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approved by American Medical Association on October 19, 1980, and by 
the American Bar Association on February 10, 1981, the formulation of 
the death criteria as WBD or irreversible cessation of heartbeat and blood 
circulation (IHB&BC) were legally accepted in many states of the USA and 
many countries in the world.
In its statement from December 2008 published under the title Contro-
versies in the Determination of Death. A White Paper by the President’s Council 
on Bioethics, the President’s Council on Bioethics in the USA decided to 
support WBD as the death criterion, even though it gave it a new name – 
the total brain failure. Until then, the functioning of the human organism 
as a whole was understood as the functioning of an organism whose parts 
cooperate in an integrating manner. However, even in some cases of WBD, 
some body parts kept functioning in an integrating manner, that some can 
take to be as the functioning of an organism as a whole. The White Paper, 
thus, suggested a new definition of the failure of an organism to function as 
a whole, based on the failure of self-preservation of an organism in contact 
with the surrounding world. It explains the contact of an organism with the 
surrounding world through three fundamental capacities:
“1. Openness to the world, that is receptivity to stimuli and signals from 
the surrounding environment. 
2. The ability to act upon the world to obtain selectively what it needs. 
3. The basic felt need that drives the organism to act as it must, to 
obtain what it needs and what its openness reveals to be available.” 
(President’s Council, 2008, 61).
The openness to the world is manifested in the consciousness of aware-
ness at least in a rudimentary form. The vegetative state patients (VSP) have 
spontaneous breathing, which manifests the need to breathe and thus gain 
what the organism needs. Patients with certain forms of brain damage can 
have their ability to breath impaired but preserve their consciousness. If 
there are no signs of consciousness and spontaneous breathing is absent, 
and both these conditions are irreversible, it is a sign that the organism as 
a whole ceased to function. (President’s Council, 2008, 59–64).
9(1)/2021 289
T RA D I T I O N A L CA R D I O P U L M O N A RY C R I T E R I O N O F D E AT H. . .
In 1990, The German Bishops’ Conference together with the Council 
of the Evangelical Church in Germany supported WBD combined with 
IHB&BC to be the criterion of human death. When the brain dies the basis 
for the spiritual existence of a person in the world vanishes. Without brain, 
a person cannot perceive, express herself, make decisions. Besides that, the 
brain integrates the organs into one organism as a whole. (Erklärung, 1990, 
17–18). However, Cardinal Meisner from Köln was against the acceptance 
of WBD as the criterion of death of man (Meisner, 1996, Nr. 316). In 2015 
in its most recent statement, the German Bishops’ Conference supports 
WBD as the death criterion (Die Deutschen Bischöfe, 2015). This statement 
also reacts to the White Paper of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 
2008. The German Bishops stress the role of the dead donor rule (DDR) in 
the process of unpaired vitally essential organ donations. They emphasize 
that already in 1993 the German Medical Association’s support of WBD as 
the criterion of human death includes not only brain’s role in the somatic 
integration, but also its importance for other functions as autonomy, 
coordination, spontaneity, and the reaction of the organism as a whole 
towards the surrounding world. 
The case of Jahi McMath provides an opportunity to introduce the 
issue of brain death to the public. In December 2013, Jahi McMath clearly 
fulfilled the criteria for WBD (Shewmon, 2018). She was on a ventilator, but 
her family did not approve her removal. In early 2014, her family reported 
that Jahi began to respond to simple motor commands. Her family began 
to make video recordings of these responses. In September 2014, MRI at 
Rutgers University Hospital showed extensive damage to white matter of the 
brain stem, but the preservation of the cerebral hemispheres, flat EEG and 
no responses to evoked potentials. Calixto Machado found electrocerebral 
activity on EEGs performed at other times. “Jahi continued to sexually 
mature after her diagnosis of brain death and menstruated. This implies 
intact hypothalamic and pituitary functions which are functions of the brain“ 
(McGee and Gardiner, 2019, 2). Jahi McMath passed away on June 22, 2018. 
According to Shewmon, since early 2014, she was in a minimal conscious 
state (Shewmon, 2018, S75), according to Machado et al. she was neither 
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in a minimal conscious state nor brain dead, she was “in a state of disorder 
of consciousness, not previously described” (Machado et al., 2018, 521; 
Machado, 2019). This case shows that neurologic criterion (WBD) cannot 
be a sign of death, or that the standards for WBD cannot meet the UDDA’s 
requirement that death is the irreversible cessation of all brain functions.
2. Five basic conceptions in the determination  
of human death
At present, there are five basic positions on the issue of determining when 
a man can be considered dead – what is the appropriate criterion of human 
death. The first maintains that death occurs with the whole brain death. 
WBD refers to the failure and irreversible cessation of all functions of the 
entire brain. The most prominent proponents of this view are James L. Bernat 
(Bernat, 1998, 2006; Bernat, Culver and Gert, 1981), Eelco F. M. Wijdicks 
(2001), Patrick Lee and German Grisez (Lee and Grisez, 2012). The second 
position argues that death occurs with higher brain death (HBD). HBD refers 
to the irreversible cessation of those brain functions that are required for 
thinking, reasoning, decision making, and other manifestations of human 
consciousness. The most prominent proponents of this criterion are e.g. 
Robert Veatch (2005), Jeff McMahan (2006), Robert Truog (2007), Calixto 
Machado (2007, 200–201),5 John P. Lizza (2018), Peter Singer (2018).6 The 
5 I infer this from his definition of death as the loss of consciousness (Machado, 2007, 200), 
later he supports WBD (Machado, 2019).
6 Peter Singer holds that HBD is the death of a person, but not the biological death of a man 
(Singer, 2018). This is based on his preference utilitarianism, his Lockean concept of per-
son understood as a rational and self-aware being (Singer, 2011, 74-75), and his view of 
the equality of all animals. Singer’s preference utilitarianism is grounded in the prefer-
ences. Preference utilitarianism “holds that we should do what, on balance, furthers the 
preferences of those affected.” (Singer, 2011, 13) More precisely, “preferences that should 
be counted … are those that we would have if we were fully informed, in a calm frame 
of mind and thinking clearly.” (Singer, 2011, 14) According to Peter Singer, all animals 
including humans are equal, which is grounded in their capacity to suffer (Singer, 1974). 
The equality of all humans and all animals is founded on the principle of equal consider-
ation of interests (Singer 2011, 16-70). All animals including humans wish to experience 
happiness and avoid suffering. According to preference utilitarianism there is a distinc-
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third view holds that human death occurs with the irreversible cessation of 
heartbeat and blood circulation (IHB&BC). The most prominent proponent 
of this view is D. Alan Shewmon (Shewmon, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2010),7 
others are e.g. Josef Seifert (1993), Nicanor Austriaco (2003), John Finnis 
(2011), David Albert Jones (2012) and Doyen Nguyen (2016, 2017, 2018a, 
2018b, 2019). The fourth position specifies that death occurs with brain stem 
death (BSD). It has been defended e.g. by Christopher Pallis (Pallis, 1982, 
1995, 1999) and D. Gardiner, et al. (2012, i14). BSD criterion was accepted 
into guidelines on the diagnosis of brain (stem) death published by the 
United Kingdom Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and their Faculties 
in 1976 and remains the basis for practice in the United Kingdom until today 
(Smith, 2015). Similarly, in Canada, there is no statutory definition of death. 
In 2003 The forum of medical experts in Vancouver recommended BSD as 
the definition of death (Shemie et al., 2006, S3). Laws in India recognize BSD 
or cardiopulmonary death (Vadi and Shroff, 2019, 368). A forum of medical 
experts in collaboration with the World Health Organization formulated 
a definition of death that is in its essence a recapitulation of the UK defi-
nition (Shemie et al., 2014, 794), in which the meaning of “permanent” is 
adopted from Bernat et al. (2010, 964–965). The fifth position specifies that 
tion “between self-aware individuals, leading their own lives and wanting to go on living, 
and those with no future-directed preferences.” (Singer, 2011, 111) Hence, according to 
Singer, it is necessary to distinguish “between killing those who are rational and self-con-
scious and killing those who are not” (Singer, 2011, 111). In his book Rethinking Life and 
Death, Peter Singer expresses his view that the concept of brain death was invented to 
obtain organs for organ transplantation and to withdraw medical treatment in hopeless 
cases. At the time, the standard sets of tests did not show an irreversible cessation of 
all functions of the brain. Legal definitions and medical practice have, thus, come apart. 
Singer suggests adjusting the definition of death (Singer 1994, ch. 2). According to Singer 
and his preference utilitarianism, “an action contrary to the preference of any being is 
wrong, unless this preference is outweighed by contrary preferences. Killing a person who 
prefers to continue living is therefore wrong, other things being equal.” (Singer, 2011, 
80). According to Singer, embryos, fetuses and newborns have no interests. Thus, if their 
relatives do not want them to live, abortion and infanticide are permissible (Singer, 2011, 
154). Singer justifies voluntary euthanasia on the grounds of respect for the preferences 
and clear rational basis for the decision itself, and involuntary euthanasia only if it can 
prevent torture or worse evil (Singer, 2011, 176-178).
7 Shewmon first used to hold HBD (Shewmon, 1985), but in 1997 he abandoned his position 
in favor of IHB&BC and developed a critique of WBD (Shewmon, 1997). 
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death occurs after the cessation of heartbeat and blood circulation. This 
criterion is sometimes called controlled cardiac/circulatory death (CC/CD) 
(Nguyen 2018a, 111–139). It has been introduced by the Pittsburgh Protocol 
in 1992 (University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 1993). The most prominent 
proponents of this criterion are James Bernat and Alexander Capron since 
2006 (Bernat, 2008; Bernat, et al., 2006; Bernat, Capron et al. 2010), David 
J. Cole (1992, 1993), James DuBois (1999).
Moreover, there are authors, who combine WBD and IHB&BC arguing 
that sometimes death can be pronounced given the irreversible cessation 
of all functions of the entire brain, at other times given the irreversible 
cessation of the circulatory system. This view is defended e.g. by Capron 
and Kass (1972), President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1981, Eelco F. M. 
Wijdicks (2006), George Khushf (2010), and Daniel P. Sulmasy (2019).8 
The combination of WBD and IHB&BC criteria has been accepted into the 
legislation of many countries. Some authors combine WBD and CC/CD (e.g., 
Doran and Vukov, 2019). 
This article provides a set of reasons in favor of accepting the IHB&BC 
criteria and also argues that we need to adopt and follow DDR. I will focus 
on defending these views by providing positive reasons in their favor and 
also by refuting the critique developed against them by other authors.
3. Reasons for the traditional cardiopulmonary death  
as the only valid criterion of the human death
In the history of medicine and bioethics, five criteria of human death were 
occurred: (i) the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion; (ii) the whole-
brain death; (iii) the higher brain death; (iv) the brain stem death, (v) the 
controlled cardiac/circulatory death. In this chapter, I will argue that the 
8 Sulmasy admits that some patients with WBD are still alive. He proposes more precise 
tests for WBD “through inclusion of evidence of more cerebro-somatic disintegration 
(e.g., hypothalamic or neuroendocrine dysregulation)” (Sulmasy, 2019, 479).
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whole brain death, the higher brain death, the brain stem death and the 
controlled cardiac/circulatory death are not criteria of human death.
(1) Whole brain death
After given rationale through Bernat, Culver and Gert (1981) and its accep-
tance through President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1981), and by the 
formulation of UDDA through National Conference on Commissioners 
of Uniform State Laws, which was approved 1981, WBD (or IHB&BC) was 
approved by laws in many states of the USA and throughout the world. 
WBD was not accepted by some prominent philosophers and physicians, 
e.g. Hans Jonas (1974), D. Alan Shewmon (1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2010), 
Nicanor Austriaco (2003), Robert Truogh (2007), John Finnis (2011)9, David 
Albert Jones (2012), Michel Accad (2015), Doyen Nguyen (2016, 2017, 2018a, 
2018b, 2019), David S. Oderberg (2019). The main reason for rejection 
WBD is given by empirical findings interpreted in the light of Thomistic 
anthropology, the main features of which are accepted in the teaching of 
the Catholic Church. The arguments for WBD are based on three main 
presuppositions: (1) brain is the main integrator of the human organism 
(Accad, 2015), (2) a living body after determining WBD is not a human body 
(Accad, 2015), (3) the loss of psycho-physical integration needed for the 
reaction to outer stimuli (Gligorov, 2016), which is constituted by the loss 
of spontaneous breathing together with the loss of the bodily integration, 
and the loss of the psychological integration. The first presupposition is 
maintained by e.g. Bernat, Culver and Gert (1981) and Moschella (2019). 
But it is empirically untenable. This is also mentioned in the White Pater 
of the President’s Council on Bioethics in the USA that brain is not the 
integrator of the human body (President’s Council, 2008, 40) and that body 
of WBD patients can have some mode of integration (President’s Council, 
2008, 49–68). Shewmon mentions the case of TK that survived more than 
9 John Finnis changes his acceptance of the criterion of death from WBD to IHB&BC after 
Shewmon’s lecture (1998) (Finnis, 2011).
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14,5 years after diagnosed as brain dead (1998a, 1543; 1998b, 136). This 
case was confirmed after his cardiac arrest in January 2004, and the autopsy 
showed that his brain was destroyed and mummified (Repertinger et al., 
2006). A dead brain cannot be an integrator of a human body. According to 
Maureen L. Condic WBD body is not integrated, because the body also needs 
the nervous system and especially the brain; it is only coordinated (Condic, 
2016, 271). Coordination, according to Condic, is “the ability of a stimulus, 
acting through a specific signaling molecule, to bring responding cells 
into a common action or condition” and can be accomplished by either the 
nervous system or other bodily systems (Condic, 2016, 271). Integration is 
the “compilation of information from diverse structures and systems” and 
“during postnatal stages of human life is uniquely accomplished by the 
nervous systems, most especially the brain” (Condic, 2016, 271). But if the 
organs and tissues in a WBD body were only coordinated, they couldn’t long 
survive. Organs for transplantation after retrieval from an organism cannot 
be viable for a long time (kidneys – 24 hours, liver – 12–15 hours, lungs – 8 
hours, heart 6 – hours) (Guibert et. al. 2011, 128).10 Shewmon mentions many 
not-brain-mediated integrative functions e.g. homeostasis, assimilation of 
nutrients, elimination, detoxication and recycling of cellular wastes, energy 
balance, maintenance of body temperature, wound healing, fighting off 
infections, febrile response to infection, cardiovascular and hormonal stress 
responses to the incision for organ retrieval, successful gestation of a fetus, 
sexual maturation (Shewmon 1998b, 139–140). This allows the integration 
of whole brain death bodies. The second presupposition is held e.g. Patrick 
Lee and Germain Grisez (2012). The teaching of the Catholic Church on 
the soul as the form of the body, i.e. the hylomorphic conception of human 
beings, can be used to argue against this presupposition (Denzinger, 1991, 
Council of Vienne 1312, No. 902, 391). The best solution is to accept one 
substantial form of human being, that is human soul, as suggested by 
Thomas Aquinas (Thomas Aquinas, 1918, l. 2, cap. 63, Nr. 3, 433). If a body 
10 This was the main reason for changing my view from WBD (Volek, 2009) to IHB&BD as the 
criterion of death in this paper.
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after WBD diagnosis can be alive for 14,5 years and if some pregnant women 
with WBD diagnosis were able to finish their pregnancy with viable children 
(Esmaeilzadeh et al., 2010), then their bodies were integrated with a human 
soul (Nguyen, 2018a, 233–346). The rejection of WBD as the criterion of 
human death is thus also coherent with the teaching of the Catholic Church. 
Pope John Paul II mentions the neurological criterion only once, and only 
hypothetically, in his address to the Transplantation Society on August 29, 
2000. The presuppositions mentioned by the pope in this address are not 
fulfilled (Nguyen, 2017). These three presuppositions are: (1) the definitive 
loss of the unity of body and spirit, (2) the “clearly determined parameters 
commonly held by the international scientific community”, (3) the rigorous 
application of the clinical tests (Giovanni Paolo II., 2000, No. 5, 283). The 
definitive loss of the unity of body and spirit can be applied only when the 
integration of the organism as a whole failed – this is not the case with 
WBD. The parameters for the determination of WBD are not the same either 
within the USA (Greer et al., 2008, 2016) or in the world (Wijdicks, 2006). 
In 2010, the American Academy of Neurology (AAN) specified Standards 
for Determining BD. These Standards are understood as a material for the 
development of policies in the US hospitals (Wijdicks et al, 2010). The 
rigorous application of the clinical tests is not convincing because the 
AAN Standards from 2010 propose tests of BSD that can cause the death 
of a patient with several brain injury (e.g. apnea test). This contradicts 
UDDA and Thomistic Christian anthropology (Nguyen 2016, 2019). There 
is no definitive teaching of the Catholic Church on this issue and ethicists 
are to form their conscience (Ostertag, and Karcher, 2019). This formation 
should be open to the news provided by science.
(2) The higher brain death
The proponents of HBD argue that biological death applies only to bodily 
integration. Since they hold that death cannot be defined biologically, but 
one has to focus on the moral dimension of this event, they, therefore, 
hold the view that death occurs with the irreversible loss of psychological 
functions occurring in HBD (Veatch, 2005). 
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In line with this reasoning, D. Alan Shewmon says that the necessary, as 
well as the sufficient criterion of death, understood as passing away occurs 
in “the absence of both consciousness and circulation of oxygenated blood 
for a period of time at least up to the moment of deanimation.“ (Shewmon, 
2010, 278). He understands deanimation as the “irreversible  cessation of the 
organism as a whole.” The necessary and sufficient criterion of deanimation 
is the “irreversible cessation of anti-entropic exchange of substances with 
the environment’’ (Shewmon, 2010, 281). Instead of defining “death” as 
such, Shewmon proposes to define the two aforementioned death-related 
events, namely “passing away” and “deanimation” (Shewmon, 2010, 291). 
According to research conducted by Owen et al. using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), a patient in the vegetative state asked 
to imagine playing tennis or walking in her house had the same neural 
responses as healthy people asked to imagine the same thing. This points 
to the conclusion that people in a vegetative state have some awareness of 
these commands to imagine something (Owen et al., 2006, 402). In a state 
of deep coma or vegetative state, there are psychological processes taking 
place. That means HBD is not an adequate criterion of human death since 
the patients with HBD, be it in a coma or vegetative state, still have or can 
have psychological experiences, and thus there is still life in them. Bodies 
with biological life are integrated, and according to Thomistic Christian 
anthropology, human soul remains in them, as in WBD bodies.
(3) The brain stem death
According to brain stem death view (BSD), it is sufficient to declare a man 
dead, when (s)he is diagnosed as BSD. Other parts of the brain can remain 
alive. This criterion is legal only in the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
India. In the UK it is adopted as an accepted medical definition of death. 
It was first formulated in 1976 as a criterion of death and equated with 
death in 1979 (Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and their Faculties 
in the United Kingdom, 1976, 1979). In 1995 and 2008, BSD as a criterion 
of death was formulated as “irreversible loss of the capacity for conscious-
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ness, combined with irreversible loss of the capacity to breathe” (Working 
Group of the Royal College of Physicians, 1995, 381; Academy of Medical 
Royal Colleges, 2008, 11) The first part of this definition of BSD is equal 
to HBD. This definition of BSD was criticized e.g. by D. Alan Shewmon 
(1998b, 132–133) and Abigail Maguire (2019). First, I will mention some of 
Shewmon’s objections that I take to be significant. This criterion of death 
could also be met by someone in the state of the permanent vegetative state 
with diaphragmatic paralysis without their brainstem being dead. It is not 
clear if this concept “should require the entire brainstem to be dead or all 
brainstem reflexes to be absent, most of which have no bearing on either 
consciousness or breathing” (Shewmon, 1998b, 133). Bodies of BSD patients 
remain integrated because they remain integrated also in WBD, and BSD 
criterion is weaker than WBD. Second, according to Maguire (2019), BSD 
alone is insufficient for the definition of death. The main objection is that 
consciousness is realized by the networking between the brain stem and 
other regions of cortex (Medford and Critchley, 2010; Demertzi et al., 2015). 
The mind understood as consciousness is necessarily embodied (McMahan, 
2006, 47). In other words, in the Thomistic anthropology and according to 
contemporary biology, patients with BSD are somatically alive (Norkowski, 
2018) and thus a rational soul is also present.
(4) The controlled cardiac/circulatory death
According to the Pittsburgh Protocol from 1992 (University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center, 1993) patient or their legal guardian can decide to forgo 
a life-sustaining treatment. The patient can be pronounced dead after cardiac 
arrest and 2 minutes of asystole or ventricular fibrillation or electromechan-
ical dissociation and confirmed by EKG and apnea and lack of responses 
to verbal stimuli. After the pronouncement of death, the procurement of 
organs for transplantation can begin. In 1967, Christiaan Barnard used this 
procedure in his first heart transplantation. He waited for five minutes with 
flat EEG and then begun the heart removal (Barnard, 1967, 1271). Bernat 
proposed death 75 seconds after asystole (Bernat, 2008, 671). However, 
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according to medical records, there was a case when autoresuscitation 
occurred 33 minutes past asystole (Hornby, Hornby, and Shemie, 2010, 
1246). It can thus be accepted, that the possibility of reversal exists up till 
35 minutes from asystole. A man is dead only when this possibility fails/
is not present. This is conceded also by a secular bioethicist Don Marquis 
when he maintains that CC/CD donors are not dead (Marquis, 2010). Patient 
autonomy cannot serve as a ground for the acceptance of this criterion either 
since it is equivalent to assisted suicide. It is against the greatest value in 
this life, against human life.11
4. The Dead donor rule
Shewmon as a prominent critic of WBD surprisingly argues in favor of 
unpaired vital organ donation from donors after asystole (Shewmon, 1998b, 
128–129; 2010, 288) similarly as Peter Singer (Singer, 2018), which violates 
the DDR. Shewmon proposes to replace the DDR with the “deceased donor 
rule” that even preserves the acronym, which requires that the removal of 
vital unpaired organs does not cause the donor’s passing away (Shewmon, 
2010, 289).12 In opposition to that, the proponents of WBD Khushf and 
Bernat argue that the DDR should be preserved (Khushf, 2010, 331, 356; 
Bernat, 2013). The reason for preserving DDR is that dying patients must 
be able to donate their organs voluntarily. Otherwise, they might fear that 
their vital unpaired organs might be removed before they are pronounced 
dead. Bernard and Dalle Ave also argue that the removal of organs for 
transplantation does not require that the condition of irreversibility be 
met, but that the donation has to be done after brain circulation deter-
mination of death, which can be done based on the cessation of brain 
11 For the critique of all the important justifications of CC/DC see Ngyuen (2018a, 111-139).
12 David Albert Jones (2012, 138) interprets Shewmon (2010, 276) and his argument about 
two types of end of human life (metaphysical and civil) as confirmation of the DDR, but 
Shewmon’s views seem to point to the opposite. The very distinction between civil end 
of life as sufficient for ethical and legal purposes, as well as for organ transplantation, 
from the metaphysical end of life as the death of organism and deanimation, and also the 
replacement of DDR with the deceased donor rule point to Shewmon’s rejection of DDR. 
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circulation and function (Dalle Ave and Bernat, 2017). As a moral duty in 
organ donation, DDR has been emphasized also by Popes John Paul II.13 
and Benedict XVI.14 
DDR should be preserved based on the value of human life which is 
the highest of all earthly values. Although scarifying oneself for others is 
a noble act, organ donation includes organ removal by the doctors, who also 
have to respect the value of human life. For this reason, it is unacceptable 
they kill human beings by removing the organs of living donors, not even 
if they are already in the process of dying and the donor expressed his or 
her consent with such procedure. The autonomy concerning the decisions 
about one’s life has its limits set by the requirement to respect the highest 
value of human life. An innocent person cannot be licitly killed (except in 
the case of war) since among all the earthly living beings, the human being 
has the highest moral value. To respect DDR is to respect human life, which 
can also be expressed as respect for the sanctity of human life.
5. Recommendations for the time to allow organs  
procurement for transplantation
Organ procurement from death bodies is allowed only after the passing of 
the possibility of resuscitation. David Oderberg is right with his statement 
that “the bodily decomposition is a sure sign of a death”, but it is problematic 
to see this as the only sign of death (2019, 359). But decomposition cannot 
serve as a criterion for transplantation of vital unpaired organs since the 
organs are not viable for transplantation after the signs of decomposition 
as rigor mortis have occurred. Shewmon maintains, that a waiting period of 
13 “It is obvious that vital organ can only be donated after death.“ (Giovanni Paolo II., 1991, 
No. 4, 1712) „Acknowledgement of the unique dignity of the human person has a further 
underlying consequence: vital organs which occur singly in the body can be removed only 
after death, that is from the body of someone who is certainly dead.“ (Giovanni Paolo II., 
2000, 282)
14 „It is helpful to remember, however, that the individual vital organs cannot be extracted 
except ex cadavere, which, moreover, possesses its own dignity that must be respected.“ 
(Benedict XVI, 2008)
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“20–30 minutes following circulatory arrest would be a reasonable guess.” 
(1997, 80). However, this period must be determined more precisely. Based 
on the comparison of the international standards, the longest waiting 
period after cardiac arrest for the declaration of death is set at 10 minutes 
in Switzerland and in the International Advisory Committee of the First 
International Workshop on Non-Heart- Beating Donors (NHBD) (Dhanani 
et al., 2012). In the scientific medical literature, we find a mention of 
a case, when autoresuscitation occurred 33 minutes after asystole (Hornby, 
Hornby, Shemie, 2010, 1246).15 Only after this time, one can acquire moral 
certainty that the death of a patient occurred. It is thus possible to begin the 
organ procurement only after 35 minutes past asystole. This time provides 
sufficient opportunity to gain moral certainty that the donor is dead.
Conclusion
The traditional cardiopulmonary criterion of death proved to be the only 
valid criterion of human death. WBD, HBD, BSD and CC/CD are not adequate 
criteria of human death. This thesis was justified by empirical findings 
combined with Thomistic Christian anthropology. In the article, I have also 
pointed to the need to accept the DDR. I recommend 35 minutes waiting 
period after the cessation of the heartbeat to begin with organ removal, 
which constitutes my original contribution to this topic. The waiting period is 
supported by empirical findings that an autoresuscitation was still recorded 
after 33 minutes past asystole. My contribution further lies in a systematic 
treatment of this issue.
Funding was providing by the grant VEGA no. 1/0637/20.
Translated by Ján Baňas
15 The most recent literature does not mention a longer period until autoresuscitation 
(Hornby, Dhanani, Shemie, 2018).
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